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Shall Wagnerism Have No Dominion?1 
Eric Tucker  
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
The theme of Wagnerism has been attracting increasing attention in Canada for several 
reasons. Perhaps the greatest stimulus for the debate recently is the controversy over the 
constitutionalization of labour rights and whether some elements of the Wagner Act model, 
particularly majoritarian exclusivity2 should be established as a minimum requirement for a 
collective bargaining law to pass constitutional muster. But that is not the only reason for 
interest in considering the fate of Wagnerism. There are two additional developments that are 
driving this concern. The first is the legislative erosion of statutory collective bargaining 
schemes —the primary reason for seeking their constitutionalization—which has been taking 
place in fits and starts over the past forty years. However, it is important to make clear that 
these are not attacks on Wagnerism tout court but rather on particular elements of the model, 
the ones that support collective bargaining, rather than the ones that fragment and limit it.3 The 
second development is not a legal one, but a political-economic one. There has been a shift from 
an accumulation regime informed by weak Keynesianism, in which the dominant production 
model was the large integrated firm that made long-term commitments to their employees and 
in which the dominant gender contract had married women working in the home, to a 
Neoliberal one, in which production increasingly occurs through networks, in which employers 
make few commitments to workers and in which women’s labour force participation approaches 
that of men. This change has transformed the landscape in which labour and employment laws 
operate, producing regulatory mismatches that undermine the labour law’s effectiveness even in 
the absence of retrenchment by the state. Higher levels of employer hostility to trade unions and 
collective bargaining, and labour market and industrial restructuring in which fewer workers 
have full-time, full-year jobs, permanent jobs, and in which they are more likely to be employed 
in small workplaces or in globally competitive industries combine to produce conditions 
antithetical to the functioning of Wagnerism. If true, then even if Wagnerism was to survive as a 
legal regime, its domain in the ‘Dominion’ is likely to continue to shrink to nominal levels in the 
for-profit, capitalist sector of the economy.  
The purpose of this article is to assess the state of the Wagner Act model (WAM) in Canada 
and to argue that that while its defence, whether through political action or constitutional 
litigation, may be a necessary objective given that under present conditions the alternatives to it 
are likely to be worse, it is not an adequate strategy for reversing the decline of collective 
bargaining, particularly in the private sector. I begin with an overview of trends in labour 
legislation and then focus specifically on Saskatchewan’s controversial Bill 85, enacted in May, 
2013 and on the Harper government’s recent federal sector labour laws. I argue that although 
Canada has not witnessed an assault on statutory collective bargaining rights, there has been a 
marked erosion of them. In the next part I review attempts to constitutionalize collective labour 
rights and argue that the prospects for their protection—not just measured in terms of 
preserving WAM, but of setting a baseline that would protect meaningful collective bargaining—
is dimming. In the third section I turn to the central argument that Wagnerism’s survival would, 
in any event, leave it with a shrinking dominion. Finally, I conclude with a few thoughts on the 
limits of law and what else might be done. 
Before proceeding, however, it will be helpful to clarify what Wagnerism is and the relation 
between Wagnerism and collective labour rights more broadly. Most obviously, Wagnerism is 
simply a specific model of collective labour rights and like all models of labour rights it 
addresses three key issues: 1) trade union formation; 2) bargaining structure; and 3) dispute 
resolution. However, the ways in which Wagnerism addresses these key issues are not all 
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distinctly Wagnerian. Some of its elements are common to most collective bargaining regimes 
and are recognized as such by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other 
international institutions. Therefore, we need to be careful to distinguish between Wagnerian 
and non-Wagnerian elements of Canadian collective bargaining law, even though an erosion of 
any element may result in WAM becoming ineffective.  
In the list below, I have made a preliminary attempt to identify the basic elements of the 
Canadian collective bargaining model, indicating which are distinctly Wagnerian (W) and which 
are more universal (U). In making this list, I appreciate that lines cannot always be drawn 
sharply and that, for example, the Wagnerian context within which a more universal element is 
located, may give it a particular form and content. Thus, in the recent Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal judgment in R. v. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour,4 the court explained its 
reluctance to recognize the right to strike as a free-standing dimension of freedom of association 
because the specific form that was being claimed was Wagnerian and the court was not prepared 
to constitutionalize a particular statutory model of labour rights. Nevertheless, I believe it is still 
useful to categorize these elements because it is possible to argue, for example, that some 
elements, like the freedom to strike, are more universally recognized than others, like 
majoritarian exclusivity.  
 
1. Trade Union Formation:  
a. legal protection against state and employer interference with union 
organizing (U) 
b. majoritarian exclusivity (W) 
c. state determination of appropriate certification units (W) 
2. Bargaining Structure:  
a. state determination of appropriate bargaining units, which for the most part 
track certification units (W) 
b. highly decentralized bargaining (essential enterprise bargaining as the norm) 
(W) 
3. Dispute Resolution: 
a. terms and conditions of employment are determined by collective bargaining 
between the parties (U) 
b. a legal duty to bargain in good faith is imposed on the parties (W) 
c. bargaining impasses are resolved by strikes and lock-outs, with the result 
largely determined by the relative bargaining power of the parties (U) 
d. strikes and lockouts are prohibited while a collective agreement is in force 
and until negotiations have reached an impasse and conciliation has been 
completed (W) 
e. disputes over the interpretation and application of collective agreements are 
to be resolved by binding arbitration (W) 
 
Additionally, the effectiveness of WAM crucially depends on the existence of labour boards 
with the power to enforce its strictures and provide meaningful remedies when violations 
occurred. The erosion of this administrative apparatus would also significantly harm the model 
(Arthurs 2006; Slinn 2008), but this is not a matter addressed here. 
 It is important to keep all of these dimensions in mind because, as we shall see, legislative 
erosion is partial; some elements of WAM, particularly fragmented bargaining structures in the 
private sector, remain untouched or are expanded, while other, more universal elements, such 
as the freedom to strike, are being restricted.  
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I. LEGISLATIVE EROSION OF LABOUR RIGHTS 
 
While Americans sometimes may think that if they let their gaze follow the North Star to 
Canada they will find a more progressive version of Wagnerism, the fact of the matter is that the 
shine has been fading for many years, in both the private and the public sectors, as the result of 
the legislative erosion of labour rights. While it is true that compared to American ossification 
(Estlund 2002), Canadian labour law has been frequently amended, the trend in the more recent 
past has been towards the weakening, not strengthening of labour rights, and it is arguable that 
the pace of erosion may accelerate, depending the electoral fortunes of right-wing parties. Not 
surprisingly, there is a sense of foreboding about Wagnerism’s future among many Canadian 
academics.5 
The Canadian Foundation of Labour Rights (CFLR) maintains a database of labour laws 
restricting collective bargaining and trade union rights dating back to 1982, the year the Charter 
came into force. On a visit in early February, 2014, 207 laws were listed. The database does not 
distinguish between legislation targeting public and private sector unions, but it is well known 
that the public sector has been the primary target of what has aptly been characterized as 
‘permanent exceptionalism,’ (Panitch and Swartz 2003) consisting of back-to-work statutes 
ending lawful strikes, imposed wage restraint, restrictions on the scope of bargaining, and the 
expansion of essential service worker designations. These are restrictions on Wagnerism’s 
commitment to negotiated contracts determined by the bargaining power of the parties, and 
even though this principle was only partially embraced for the public sector in the best of times, 
its erosion in recent years is undisputed. Moreover, as we shall see, the principal alternative, 
binding interest arbitration by a neutral third-party, is also being degraded. 
Opposed to this view is a recent review of labour and employment law changes by Kevin 
Banks who has come to different conclusion (Banks 2013). His study is much broader in its 
focus, looking at minimum standards as well as collective bargaining legislation, but specifically 
in regard to the latter, Banks finds that “it cannot be said that there has been any trend across 
Canada over the past decade [2001-11] toward weaker protection of private sector rights to 
organize and bargain collectively” (ibid). In part, the difference between the CFLR study and 
Banks’ is his exclusive focus on the private sector. But even leaving that difference aside, because 
Banks’ study only begins in 2001, it misses the single most important change to private sector 
Canadian collective bargaining law, the shift away from card count certifications toward 
mandatory elections. Prior to 1977 all Canadian jurisdictions provided for card count 
certifications. Currently, the only ones that retain card counts are the federal jurisdiction, 
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Quebec. While the 
number of jurisdictions retaining card counts might seem high, it is important to note that these 
laws only cover about one-third of the labour force,6 leaving about two-thirds under a 
mandatory voting regime. Most of these changes occurred before 2001, when Banks’ study 
begins. 
The impact of this change has been the subject of a number of studies and while their 
findings differ on the extent of the impact, they are unanimous in its direction. The shift to 
mandatory elections has reduced the likelihood of certification success and negatively affected 
the unionization rate. The effect of the change is buffered to an extent by the tight timelines the 
legislation typically imposes between the filing of a certification application and the holding of 
an election, but a negative effect still remains (Warner 2012; Johnson 2004; Riddell 2004; Slinn 
2004). 
Another matter that Banks overlooked is that in the toing and froing of labour law that 
occurs when governments change, the restoration of labour rights previously stripped away is 
not always complete. So while it is true, as Banks says, that in 2005 the Liberal government in 
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Ontario restored to labour boards the power to order remedial certifications where employer 
unfair labour practices prevent workers from freely expressing their wishes in a certification 
election and to order interim reinstatement of employees allegedly discharged for trade union 
activity, these measures only partially reversed the changes made by the previous Conservative 
government in 1995. For example, card count certifications were only restored in the 
construction sector. In short, labour rights in Ontario are weaker after 2005 than they were in 
1990, before the NDP reforms of 1993.7  
Still, I think Banks’ article provides an important corrective to those who might overstate the 
extent of legislative erosion and who fail to acknowledge that some labour law reforms have 
either restored rights that were stripped away in earlier rounds of legislation or introduced new 
protections. For example, over the same period when card count certifications were being 
abolished, first contract arbitration (FCA) was being introduced. Although on its face, first 
contract arbitration might seem to be a departure from Wagnerism insofar as it provides for 
third-party imposition of terms and conditions when negotiations fail, the evidence shows that 
first contract arbitration laws increase the percentage of newly certified unions achieving first 
agreements by negotiation. Thus, FCA legislation should be viewed as remedying a weakness of 
Wagnerism —its reliance on bargaining in a context where employers are particularly resistant 
to unions and where unions lack the bargaining resources to induce employers to agree to 
minimally acceptable terms (Slinn and Hurd 2011). 
To get a better sense of these trends, it is useful to look briefly at Saskatchewan’s Bill 85, 
passed in May, 2013 and a series of federal labour statutes passed between 2011 and 2013.  
 
SASKATCHEWAN, BILL 85 
 
There was much trepidation when the Saskatchewan provincial government issued a 
consultation paper on the “renewal” of labour legislation in May, 2012 (Saskatchewan Ministry 
of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety). Nothing good could be expected from the 
ideologically conservative Saskatchewan Party that was elected in 2007, replacing an NDP 
government that had been in power for the previous 16 years, especially in light of its first foray 
into labour law reform. Shortly after its election, the government enacted Bill 5, which severely 
restricted the right of public sector workers to strike by the expansion of essential service 
designations and Bill 6, which eliminated card count certifications and expanded employer voice 
in union certification campaigns.8 The questions raised in the paper suggested the government 
was interested in widening exclusions from the Act, increasing trade-union ‘accountability’, 
facilitating decertification, restricting picketing, limiting access to first contract arbitration, and, 
most ominously, perhaps moving towards a right-to-work regime by expanding the freedom of 
workers to opt out of the union and of dues payment. When Bill 85 was introduced in December, 
2012, it turned out that the government was not going after collective bargaining law as 
aggressively as many had feared. Right-to-work type laws were not present; nor were 
restrictions on picketing. But the bill was not benign either. It proposed to:  
 
1. Broaden the confidential employee exclusion and preclude supervisors from being in 
the same bargaining unit as those they supervise  
2. Increase government involvement in dispute resolution and require a 14-day cooling-
off period and 48-hour notice to the employer before a strike can occur 
3. Provide for last-offer votes at the behest of employers, governments or employees 
4. Provide for voluntary recognition 
5. Increase decertification opportunities 
6. Require consideration of economic conditions in first contract arbitration 
7. Require unions to provide audited financial statements to members9 
5 
 
 
 
Trade unions and the NDP decried the proposed law and the rush to enact it (Stevens 2013). 
Although they did not prevent the law from being enacted, 10 the government agreed to some last 
minute amendments that lessened its impact, but did not change its fundamental thrust. One 
goal of the law is to protect managerial control from being compromised by trade union 
membership. This was accomplished through its treatment of confidential and supervisory 
employees. Most jurisdictions exclude workers employed in a confidential capacity in matters 
related to labour relations. The new Saskatchewan law is broader. It excludes workers whose 
primary duties include business strategic planning, policy advice and budget implementation 
and planning when that might impact on the bargaining unit (6-1(1)(h)(i)(B)). The new law also 
creates a new category of worker, supervisory employees, who are broadly defined to include 
people who independently assign and monitor work, schedule hours and provide comments 
used for work appraisals or merit increases and recommend discipline (6-1(1)(o)). Subject to 
certain exceptions, the bill prohibits supervisory employees being included in the same 
bargaining unit with the people they supervise (6-11(3)). This provision is in addition to the 
managerial exclusion, which does not allow managerial employees to bargain collectively. While 
the managerial exclusion is standard in Canadian Wagnerism, special treatment of an additional 
layer of supervisory employees, who presumably do not fall into the managerial exclusion, is 
not. The exclusion of these supervisory employees from all employee bargaining units will not 
only further fragment an already highly fragmented bargaining model, but in many cases will 
effectively prevent them participating in the collective bargaining regime at all. This is because 
in all but the largest workplaces, the number of supervisory workers is likely to be too small to 
support viable a viable bargaining unit. Moreover, the statutory exclusion of supervisory 
employees from larger bargaining units overrides the preference of supervisory and non-
supervisory workers to bargain together, where such a preference exists. 
The Saskatchewan government’s treatment of worker voice in bargaining unit determination 
however is not uniform. Employee voice is given weight when it can lead to more fragmentation. 
Thus, in regard to provisions around raiding, the Act provides that a union can apply to 
represent a portion of an existing bargaining unit, provided that the smaller bargaining unit is 
found to be appropriate and the majority of those in that smaller unit wish to be represented by 
the raiding union (6-10, 6-12). There is no equivalent that respects worker voice when it favours 
combining bargaining units post-certification, even where the combined unit would be an 
appropriate one. As well, worker voice is strengthened where it favours decertification (6-17). 
Unlike legislation in other provinces, which link open periods to the expiry of collective 
bargaining agreements, Bill 85 allows decertification applications to be brought any time after 
the first two years, providing only that there must be a 12-month waiting period after a failed 
application. 
The changes to collective bargaining law made by Bill 85 are surprisingly tame given the 
tone of the Consultation Paper. However, the direction of the changes is clear: the government is 
not interested in promoting trade union formation or collective bargaining, but rather in making 
sure it does not compromise business interests, particularly in regard to managerial autonomy 
and authority.  
 
FEDERAL LABOUR LAW—HARPER STYLE 
 
The current Conservative federal government, which has jurisdiction over labour relations in 
the federal public sector and the federally regulated private sector (about 10% of the Canadian 
labour force), has not modified Part I of the Canada Labour Code regarding federal private 
sector collective bargaining, but it has intervened in several high-profile strikes (or threatened 
strikes) and is in the process of enacting legislation to impose burdensome reporting 
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requirement on trade unions, reflecting its intolerance of labour disruptions in those few areas 
where workers retain an effective capacity to strike and its ideological dislike of trade unions.  
The first intervention, Bill C-6, passed in June 2011, ended a nationwide lockout of postal 
workers that followed a series of one-day rotating strikes.11 The government announced its 
intent to introduce back-to-work legislation the day after the lockout was announced, suggesting 
that the employer, Canada Post, and the government, had coordinated their actions. The law 
provided final offer selection (FOS) as the alternative dispute resolution mechanism; however, it 
did not simply leave it for an arbitrator to decide between two offers. First, the legislation 
imposed a wage settlement that was lower than the employer’s final offer at the bargaining table 
and, second, it established guiding principles for the arbitrator to follow that included  
 
the need for terms and conditions of employment that are consistent with those in 
comparable postal industries and that will provide the necessary degree of flexibility to 
ensure the short- and long-term economic viability and competitiveness of the Canada 
Post Corporation, maintain the health and safety of its workers and ensure the 
sustainability of its pension plan...12  
 
The government’s intolerance of strikes was evidenced by the fact that they ended the job 
actions notwithstanding that there was little disruption to the postal service prior to the lockout 
and a protocol to maintain essential services was in place. For these reasons, the ILO upheld the 
union’s complaint that the government’s action violated Convention 87 respecting freedom of 
association (International Labour Organization 2013). 
The second intervention was in response to a threatened strike by Air Canada’s flight 
attendants in October, 2011. Air Canada, it is to be noted, is a private carrier, not a state carrier. 
Here, the government did not enact back-to-work legislation (there had been no strike and 
Parliament was not in session) but rather the Minister of Labour, Lisa Raitt, referred the dispute 
to the labour board, which had the effect of suspending the right to strike. The legal basis for the 
action was dubious. One referral was made under s. 87.4 of the Canada Labour Code, which 
allows the Minister to send a dispute to the labour board where it poses “an immediate and 
serious danger to the safety or health of the public,” 13 a standard that could not possibly be met 
in this scenario. The second referral was made pursuant to s. 107, an obscure and little used 
provision that gives the Minister an open-ended power to do anything she deems necessary to 
maintain or secure industrial peace. In statements to the press, the Minister implied that she 
would intervene whenever a strike threatened to be economically disruptive —in other words, 
whenever a strike would be effective (Employment and Social Development Canada 2011). 
Air Canada and the flight attendants agreed to refer their outstanding disagreements for 
third party arbitration, but that was not the end of Air Canada’s labour problems. It was also 
having trouble reaching an agreement with its pilots and mechanics. In March, 2012, to prevent 
a labour disruption, the Minster referred both disputes to the labour board pursuant to s. 87.4, 
but this was simply a pretext to give her time to introduce back-to-work legislation, which she 
did shortly thereafter (Employment and Social Development Canada 2012). Unlike Bill 6, Bill C-
3314 did not set any terms and conditions, but it did follow the precedent of using FOS and 
establishing guidelines for the arbitrator to follow:  
 
the need for terms and conditions of employment that are consistent with those in other 
airlines and that will provide the necessary degree of flexibility to ensure (a) the short- 
and long-term economic viability and competitiveness of the employer; and (b) the 
sustainability of the employer’s pension plan, taking into account any short-term funding 
pressures on the employer.15  
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The last piece of back-to-work legislation was enacted in May, 2012, in response to a strike 
of Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) engineers, yard-workers and conductors. In this case, the 
government showed unusual tolerance, allowing the strike to continue for nearly a week before 
legislating an end to it.16 In this case, the government provided for the appointment of interest 
arbitrators, without establishing guiding principles to be followed.  
Given the frequency of federal interference with legal strikes, one might think Canada was 
facing a strike wave, but the reverse is true. Nationally, the number of hours lost due to strikes 
has declined sharply from 10.62 hours per employee in 1976 to 1.01 in 2011. In the federal 
jurisdiction, there were 10 strikes in 2011, admittedly an increase from 2010 in which there were 
7, but hardly a crisis.  
Not content to restrict the freedom to strike on an ad hoc basis, the Harper government has 
also decided to take more control over the collective bargaining process more generally. It has 
done this in two separate laws, both passed in 2013. The first deals with collective bargaining 
between Crown corporations and their employees.17 Bill 60, passed in June 2013, contains an 
amendment to the Financial Administration Act that authorizes Cabinet to order a Crown 
corporation to have its bargaining mandate approved by Treasury Board, in which case any 
collective agreement it negotiates much also receive Treasury Board approval. It can also order 
that the Treasury Board have someone at the bargaining table. When questioned about the 
measure, Prime Minister Harper’s Parliamentary Secretary, Pierre Poilievre explained: “I am 
not here to take marching orders from union bosses... It is for those taxpayers that we work. Not 
union bosses” (Curry 2013). In fact, arguably this is not legislation aimed at irresponsible ‘union 
bosses’ but rather targets the ‘irresponsible’ managers that the government appoints to run its 
Crown corporations.  
The second legislative change was to the Public Sector Labour Relations Act, included in a 
massive budget implementation bill passed in December 2013.18 The law makes many changes 
that are likely to very significantly undermine federal public sector collective bargaining. Briefly, 
the act expands the power of government to unilaterally determine what an essential service is 
and to designate which positions in the bargaining unit perform essential services. Second, the 
law takes away from unions the ability to elect between strikes and arbitration as the final 
dispute resolution mechanism. Now, arbitration is only available where the employer agrees or 
where 80% or more of the positions in the bargaining unit are declared essential. As a result, the 
employer can designate 79% of the positions as essential, with the result that the union cannot 
effectively strike in order to back its bargaining demands. Finally, if disputes do go to 
arbitration, the law now requires the arbitrator to give preponderance to certain factors, 
including “Canada’s fiscal circumstances relative to its stated budgetary policies” (s. 148(1)(b). 
In short, arbitrators are no longer independent but rather are bound to give effect to 
government policies in their awards.19  
Finally, there is Bill C-377, a private member’s bill that passed the House of Commons but 
was amended by the Senate, leaving it, at the time of writing, in a state of limbo until further 
action is taken. The Common’s version of the bill amends the Income Tax Act to require unions 
to provide detailed financial statements, including itemized expenditures over $5,000.00, which 
would be made publicly available. While the Act purports to be about transparency and 
accountability to members, the fact of the matter is that labour relations statutes in most 
provinces already require unions to provide audited financial statements to their members on 
request. So, rather than being a vehicle for promoting democracy in trade union affairs, the bill 
is better understood as ideological in its positioning of unions as unaccountable institutions that 
need to be subject to a disciplinary regime that would be condemned as unnecessary, intrusive 
and expensive government red tape if similar obligations were imposed on private corporations. 
These concerns, as well as the question of the bill’s constitutionality, gained considerable 
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traction, even among Conservative senators, which led to the unusual step of the Senate 
adopting amendments that would loosen the reporting requirements.  
In terms of Wagnerism, Bill C-377 represents a shift in its terms. Wagnerism historically 
treated unions as private associations whose internal governance was largely left for its officers 
and members. However, because unions were given an institutional role in the model, the law 
could not be completely indifferent to how they operated and so from the beginning there were 
provisions to make unions behave responsibly toward their members and the public. Unions 
were given legal status for the purpose of the collective bargaining statutes so that they could be 
sanctioned as institutions for breaching those statutes and the orders of labour boards and 
arbitrators. They were given a duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit and 
were prohibited from taking certain actions against bargaining unit members in particular 
circumstances. And, as mentioned, they had to be financially accountable to their members. So 
Bill C-377 does not introduce a new element into Wagnerism, but rather strengthens its 
disciplinary control over trade union operations.  
In sum, governments in Canada have not been engaged in a project of dismantling 
Wagnerism, but rather of reconstructing it by selectively strengthening some elements and 
weakening others, with the predominant intent of weakening the labour movement and 
undermining union bargaining strength. While these changes do not account for the entirety of 
the decline in union density and weakening bargaining power, they have contributed to these 
outcomes and accelerated the trend toward Wagnerism’s shrinking dominion in the Dominion. 
Moreover, in the near future, it is more likely that there will be further erosion of collective 
labour rights than strengthening of them. In Ontario, Tim Hudak, the leader of the provincial 
Conservative Party, had promised to introduce right-to-work laws if elected (although he 
recently pulled back from this position) and at the federal level of government on June 5, 2013, a 
member of the Conservative caucus, Mr. Calkins, introduced a private member’s bill into the 
House of Commons, that would abolish card count certifications and replace them with a 
mandatory voting scheme that would require a union to win a majority of the members of the 
bargaining unit, not just of those who cast votes, to become certified and to remain certified if a 
decertification application is brought.20 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZING LABOUR RIGHTS—A QUIXOTIC QUEST TO 
PROTECT LABOUR RIGHTS? 
 
Labour unions have resisted the erosion of Wagnerism politically and, as we noted, have 
been partially successful, sometimes softening legislation, as in Saskatchewan, and other times 
getting some provisions repealed when more labour friendly parties take office, as in Ontario. 
However, those partial successes have not been adequate to prevent Wagnerism’s erosion in a 
timely way. As a result, organized labour has also adopted a legal strategy aimed at 
constitutionalizing labour rights. In assessing this strategy we need to ask two questions. The 
first is whether the Constitution can require or protect Wagnerism. The second, and more 
important one, is whether the Constitution can require or protect meaningful labour rights more 
generally. I’m skeptical on both counts. But first, a short review. 
As is well known, prior to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, about the only role of 
Canadian constitutional law in the labour area was the determination that labour was a matter 
of property and civil rights and therefore primarily a matter of provincial jurisdiction.21 
Sometimes labour laws were struck down because one level of government exceeded its 
authority, but the courts’ role was limited. It is perhaps fortuitous that the Charter came into 
force at the moment when the Canadian state began its turn towards neo-liberalism, but the fact 
that the Charter was in play as it happened made it almost inevitable that the labour movement 
would seek its protection when governments enacted back-to-work legislation. This produced 
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the first labour trilogy in which the Supreme Court of Canada declared that freedom of 
association protects the freedom to form associations but not the freedom to engage in activities 
central to the association’s purposes.22 Therefore, while the government could not prohibit trade 
union formation, it was free to restrict collective bargaining and strikes.  
The first indication that the court was prepared to go beyond this very thin conception of 
freedom of association appeared in Dunmore where the court decisively held that freedom of 
association not only protects the freedom of individuals to do in association that which they 
were legally free to do individually, but also that it would protect some group activities that did 
not have an individual analog.23 This included the freedom to make group representations, 
although not the freedom to bargain collectively. But a Charter of freedoms (and not rights) in 
the field of labour provides no protection at all for private sector workers who might face 
retaliation from employers for exercising their freedoms. Recognizing this, the SCC also 
accepted that in limited circumstances, where workers could not enjoy Charter-protected 
freedoms without rights, the Charter might also require the state to protect freedom of 
association with rights that imposed duties on employers not to interfere with associational 
freedoms. Farm workers were such a group and so one element of Wagnerism (although not an 
element unique to Wagnerism) was constitutionally required: the right not suffer adverse 
employment consequences for engaging in associational activities. As well, because the court 
recognized that a core associational freedom was the freedom to make collective representations 
that too was protected activity. This was not quite Wagnerism though because the court did not 
say that freedom of association protected collective bargaining, only the freedom to make 
collective representations.  
The Ontario government responded by enacting the Agricultural Employees Protection Act 
(AEPA), which provided farm workers only with the minimum rights and freedoms that the 
court had stipulated, except in one regard.24 The court had spoken only about the freedom to 
make collective representations. It had not attached a correlative duty on agricultural employers 
to respond to those representations, which was understandable given that the court was still 
unwilling to extend freedom of association to collective bargaining, a process that by its very 
nature requires some level of employer engagement. But the AEPA provided that employers 
were obliged to listen to oral representations and read written ones (call this Dunmore +). 
However, given the deep historical animosity of agricultural employers to trade unions, it was 
pretty obvious that the regime would not enable farm workers to establish collective bargaining 
relationships with their employers and that turned out to be the case in the few cases where 
farm workers tried to use the AEPA (Hanley 2012). 
In the meantime, the SCC threw overboard its first trilogy in BC Health Services in 2007 and 
declared that freedom of association did protect a limited right to collective bargaining.25 We 
need not parse the judgments here; it has been done elsewhere (eg. Fudge 2008; Tucker 2008). 
The important point for our purposes was that the SCC not only found that freedom of 
association protects the freedom to bargain collectively, but that for that freedom to be 
meaningful there must also be a duty on employers to bargain in good faith. This clearly 
embraced a core principle of Wagnerism: employers have a duty to bargain in good faith with 
unions and, perhaps, with associations of employees.  
 The SCC, however, was also quick to point out the limits of its holding. First, the Charter 
applied only to government, so while the government could not refuse to bargain in good faith, it 
was not necessarily the case that the government had a positive obligation to include such a duty 
in its private sector labour laws. Second, the Charter did not protect a right to a particular 
outcome, but rather to a process. Third, notwithstanding the court’s finding that the process 
entailed a duty to bargain in good faith (arguably a very Wagnerian element) the court 
stipulated that the Charter protects a general process of collective bargaining, rather than a 
particular model (e.g., Wagnerism). Fourth, the Charter did not protect against all interferences 
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with collective bargaining, but only substantial interferences. Finally, the SCC also made it clear 
that it was not deciding whether freedom of association protected the right to strike.  
The immediate impact of the decision was to put government on notice that legislation 
prohibiting collective bargaining, abrogating collective agreements and unilaterally and 
peremptorily imposing terms and conditions on unionized employees were constitutionally 
suspect. So to a limited extent, the Charter seemed to protect public sector Wagnerism in the 
general sense that it required the state to bargain in good faith with groups of its employees and 
limited significant and unjustifiable state interference with the collective bargaining process. 
This was no small measure of protection in an environment in which governments have little 
patience with public sector unionism.  
Whether the Charter will protect anything more than this, or even this much, remains to be 
seen. The courts have made one thing clear: the Charter does not require other elements of 
Wagnerism. In particular, in Fraser, the SCC overruled the Ontario Court of Appeal’s (OCA) 
holding that the AEPA failed to pass constitutional muster after Health Services because it did 
not protect agricultural workers’ right to bargain collectively.26 The OCA had ruled that 
constitutionally valid farm worker collective bargaining legislation must provide for 
majoritarian exclusivity, which the AEPA did not. Of course, it is arguable that the OCA imposed 
that requirement not because they believed that Wagnerism in general was constitutionally 
required but rather because in the particular circumstances of agricultural workers in Ontario 
no other regime would enable them to enjoy collective bargaining. But the SCC did not have 
farm workers very much in mind in their Fraser judgments.27 Instead, they used the case to 
emphasize, in the strongest terms, that Wagnerism generally is not constitutionally mandated.  
The more troubling question though is what labour rights are constitutionally protected after 
Fraser? Presumably, the core of Dunmore remains unaffected. Freedom of association protects 
the freedom to form associations and to make collective representations, and where it can be 
established that groups of workers cannot meaningfully enjoy those freedoms without rights the 
state will be obliged to provide them. Also, the SCC insisted that Health Services remains valid 
law, notwithstanding a spirited attack on the decision by two concurring justices who would 
have overruled it and another concurrence that would have read Health Services so narrowly as 
to achieve the same result. However, Fraser did introduce considerable uncertainty about the 
meaning of Health Services.  
One question is the test that has to be met before the state’s obligation to impose rights to 
protect freedoms kicks in. Arguably, a rights-seeker may have to demonstrate that it is 
“effectively impossible” to enjoy associational freedoms absent the statutory rights being sought. 
Hence farm workers lost in Fraser because they could not show it was impossible for them to 
enjoy their protected freedoms with the rights given to them under the AEPA (properly 
interpreted). The impossibility standard has also been imposed in the context of challenges to 
positive state action that allegedly limits associational activity. For example, the Federal Court of 
Appeal upheld the Expenditure Restraint Act, which rolled back previously approved pay 
increases for RCMP officers on the ground that it “did not make it impossible for members of 
the RCMP to achieve workplace goals.”28 
A second and, perhaps, more problematic feature of Fraser is what is has to say about the 
scope of freedom of association itself. While there were ambiguities in Health Services, it 
seemed fairly clear that freedom of association extended to collective bargaining, not merely to 
making collective representations. Moreover, since the court could not conceive of an effective 
freedom to bargain collectively without a correlative duty on employers to bargain in good faith 
as this was understood in Canadian Wagnerism, it imposed this duty as a constitutional 
requirement as well. It therefore followed that if private sector workers could not enjoy the 
freedom to bargain collectively without positive state support, then the state would be under a 
duty to legislatively impose a duty to bargain in good faith on private sector employers. That was 
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the theory of the plaintiff’s case in Fraser. After Fraser, this proposition is dubious. Rather, it 
seems, freedom of association protects the freedom to make collective representations and if it is 
effectively impossible for private sector workers to have their representations considered in 
good faith then the government has a positive obligation to impose such a duty. The AEPA, 
properly interpreted (pumped up to Dunmore ++), was found to impose such a duty and so it 
passed constitutional muster. Similarly, in cases alleging positive state interference, the courts 
have asked whether it was still possible to have collective representations considered in good 
faith.29 
 Of course, we do not know what it means concretely for employers to have a duty to 
consider collective representations in good faith. It is possible that this duty could be interpreted 
so that it is not substantially different from a duty to bargain in good faith as it is conventionally 
understood, but it may not be.30 In that case, something less will pass muster and if that 
something less is that employers must listen to oral representations and read written ones, and 
then can respond by saying, “thank you very much but having carefully considered your 
representations we are not prepared to accept them,” then the game will hardly be worth the 
candle. Not only would this be Wagnerism watered down to thin gruel, but the adoption of such 
an approach would also relieve government of any constitutional obligation protect or provide 
meaningful collective bargaining in the Canadian context.31 
How thin this gruel will be may ultimately depend on what the court does in the area of 
dispute resolution. Under Wagnerism (but not exclusively Wagnerism) the duty to bargain in 
good faith does not guarantee any particular outcome. Ultimately, the result of negotiations 
depends on bargaining power, which in the case of labour is contingent on the union’s ability to 
inflict significant economic harm on an employer by collectively withdrawing labour—striking. 
Collective bargaining without this power degrades into collective begging. No one believes that 
the Charter guarantees some level of bargaining leverage, but many argue that it does protect 
the freedom to strike because absent that freedom, the freedom to bargain collectively—or even 
to make collective representations—is meaningless.  
The original Trilogy roundly rejected the claim that freedom of association protected the 
freedom to strike. Health Services, although not deciding the issue, disparaged the reasoning 
that supported the Trilogy’s holding, and so it is (or should be) an open question whether the 
Charter protects the freedom to strike. A trial-level judgment in Saskatchewan held that the 
Charter does protect the freedom to strike, but the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned 
the judgment, holding that the Trilogy was still good law as it applied to strikes until the SCC 
ruled otherwise.32 Leave to appeal to the SCC is going to be sought, and there are other right-to-
strike cases in the works so it’s only a matter of time until the SCC will pronounce on this issue.  
Given the vagaries of the SCC’s freedom of association jurisprudence, there is little point in 
speculating about what it might do. Nevertheless, it might be useful to think conceptually about 
the alternatives and their relation to Wagnerism. Of course, the SCC could confirm the Labour 
Trilogy as it relates to dispute resolution generally and strikes in particular and then there is 
nothing more to say. Indeed, it has been suggested by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that 
this is how Fraser should be read: freedom of association only protects the right to make 
representations to have those representations considered in good faith.33 If that is the case, then 
collective labour rights generally, not just the Wagnerian version, will enjoy little meaningful 
constitutional protection. However, if the court is prepared to say that freedom of association 
requires some form of dispute resolution, then the door is open to a number of possibilities. As 
noted, in Wagnerism strikes and lockouts are the preferred mechanism for resolving bargaining 
impasses. It is the ability of a union to threaten an effective strike that gives it bargaining power. 
Therefore, it might be said that the constitutionalization of the freedom to strike could properly 
be characterized as the constitutionalization of Wagnerism. But that is misleading in that the 
freedom to strike is not unique to Wagnerism but present in many, but not all, systems of 
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industrial relations and is recognized in international law as a fundamental labour right. So the 
SCC could, if it chooses, protect the freedom to strike as a core feature of freedom of association, 
not because they are protecting a Wagnerian model of labour relations, but rather because 
freedom of association and the freedom to strike are intimately related in Canadian labour 
history (pre-dating the adoption of Wagnerism). The freedom to strike is the mechanism that 
makes collective bargaining effective in Canada, and the freedom to strike is recognized in 
international law.  
Alternatively, the court may say freedom of association protects some mechanism of dispute 
resolution, but that the freedom to strike is only one of several possible ones and it is not the 
business of the court to constitutionalize any particular model of collective bargaining, 
Wagnerian or otherwise. But presumably the court would want to set out some principles about 
constitutionally acceptable dispute resolution principles, and presumably those principles would 
not permit the unilateral imposition of terms and conditions by the employer. Rather, we would 
expect to see the court say something about having a dispute resolution mechanism that 
provides workers with a meaningful opportunity to enjoy freedom of association, which includes 
the ability to influence the terms and conditions of their employment through collective 
bargaining. Neutral third-party binding arbitration might pass constitutional muster under this 
standard insofar as it provides workers with some leverage in bargaining, assuming employers 
would prefer not to have collective agreements written by third parties. 
One last matter we might touch on briefly is whether the Charter would protect the labour 
movement against right-to-work laws. In Canada, the Rand formula, requiring all members of 
the bargaining unit to pay union dues but not be members of the union, is the Wagnerian 
standard. We know that the courts reject the view that freedom of association requires 
mandatory Rand.34 It is also unlikely the court will hold that freedom of association prevents the 
state from prohibiting Rand or even stronger forms of union security. That element of 
Wagnerism will not be protected.  
To conclude, it is important to recognize that not all elements that North Americans 
associate with Wagnerism are unique to it. Therefore, constitutionalizing particular 
requirements, such as the freedom to strike is not tantamount to constitutionalizing Wagnerism. 
Moreover, in some instances, it is appropriate to constitutionalize an element of Wagnerism, not 
because it is Wagnerism, but because that is what is minimally required for workers to enjoy 
freedom of association in the work context. That is the reason why the freedom to engage in 
associational activities requires a duty imposed on employers not to engage in unfair labour 
practices. 
But, even if the SCC upholds core elements of Wagnerism against legislative assault, or 
requires legislatures to enact them, it is unlikely to significantly alter the trajectory of collective 
bargaining in Canada. And the same conclusion also probably holds if the court rejects 
Wagnerism but constitutionally protects or requires some other set of fundamental labour 
rights, whether it be minority unionism or some bare-bones protection of concerted worker 
activity and the making of collective representations.  
 
III. WAGNERISM’S SHRINKING DOMINION 
 
There is no shortage of articles in the United States and Canada that make the point that 
Wagnerism is not working well for workers (Burkett 2013; Goddard 2013; Goddard 2013). The 
conclusion is not new. Left critics of Wagnerism have been pointing out its limitations for 
decades (eg. Fudge, Glasbeek & Tucker 1991) but were mostly ignored by industrial pluralist 
scholars who believed deeply in its promise. But the ranks of the believers are now so depleted 
that one would be hard pressed to find one. What went wrong? Again, there is a story about how 
the new political economy has radically changed the context in which Wagnerism operates, 
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which hardly needs repeating. However, there is one additional point, which pluralists often 
resist, and that is the transformation from weak Keynesianism to strong neo-liberalism is best 
viewed as a class project, not the outcome of natural processes of adjustment (Harvey 2005). 
This has important implications for thinking about the future. 
But first, Wagnerism. John O’Grady published an article in 1992, in which he predicted that 
private sector union density in Ontario would decline to between 16 and 17 percent by the end of 
the decade (O’Grady 1992). O’Grady was unduly pessimistic. In 2000, private sector unionism 
had only fallen to 18.1 percent. It took another four years until it dropped below 17 percent. 
O’Grady based his assessment on the gap between the growth in employment and the growth in 
union membership. He argued that the major reason why the growth of trade union 
membership lagged behind the growth in employment was to be found in WAM, and in 
particular in its definition of bargaining units and the radically decentralized process of 
organizing and bargaining that it entailed. Single workplace bargaining units created obstacles 
to organizing, especially in the small business sector where employer opposition was likely to be 
greater and more effective. Moreover, outside of large-scale enterprises (100 or more 
employees), whose share of the labour force had declined from 69 percent in 1978 to 61 percent 
in 1986, the costs of organizing and representing workers were large relative to the gains in 
membership and dues, and bargaining strength was likely to be low, reducing the attractiveness 
of union coverage to potential members. 
The situation for unions is now worse than when O’Grady wrote. Private sector unionization 
in Ontario dropped to 15.3 percent in 2012. In Canada it stands at 17.7 percent.35 As well, trade 
union bargaining leverage has declined. While this is more difficult to document, one measure is 
the union wage premium. In January, 1997, the average hourly rate of unionized workers in 
Canada was 30.3 percent more than unionized workers, while in June, 2013, that had dropped 
to 23.7.36 As well, the frequency of strikes and lockouts has plummeted, as is shown in Figure 1. 
Some part of the decline can be attributed to the legislative erosion documented in the first 
part of this article. The shift from card-count certification procedures to mandatory elections in 
Ontario and much of Canada has had an impact. But even if we returned to card-counts and 
implemented other pro-labour reforms, including easier union access to workers, better 
regulation of anti-union tactics and improved remedies for unfair labour practices, it is unlikely 
that private sector unions could return to the densities they reached at their peak. The problems 
run deeper. It is the mismatch between the Wagner model in which the default is no union and 
in which workplaces become unionized on a site-by-site basis. The conditions that O’Grady 
identified have not improved significantly: the share of employment in the large business sector 
(100 and more) has rebounded slightly to 64 percent; 37 labour market churning has slightly 
declined (Morissette and Qiu 2013); the percentage of self-employed workers and workers 
holding part-time and temporary jobs has slightly increased.38 Under these conditions, even 
when unions re-allocate resources into organizing, it is hard to gain density.  
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Figure 1 
Days Lost Per 1000 Workers, Public Sector and Private Sector, 1979-200739 
 
 
 
For example, in the fiscal year 2010-2011, the latest year for which data is available, private 
sector Ontario unions successfully certified 428 new units, bringing in 15,280 new covered 
employees, with an average of 35.7 employees per new bargaining unit. Of these, 48.4 percent of 
these newly certified units had less than 10 employees. Only 36 of these newly certified units had 
100 or more employees and, of these, only 2 had more than 500 (Ontario Labour Relations 
Board 2011). Organizing such small units is clearly resource intensive and the likelihood of these 
newly certified bargaining units establishing strong and stable collective bargaining 
relationships is low. Moreover, over the same period of time, many unionized manufacturing 
firms were shutting down or shedding jobs. So the overall increase in the number of employees 
covered by collective agreements between 2010 and 2011 was about 8,900. Over this same 
period of time, the number of private sector employees in Ontario increased by about 58,900.40 
At the end of the day, the labour movement had just about been able to hold the line, getting 
15.1% of the increase covered by collective agreements. Unions need to run hard just to stand 
still. 
In short, Wagnerism’s basic model—that workers must opt into collective bargaining, 
bargaining unit by bargaining unit, and that collective bargaining is to occur on an extremely 
fragmented basis—creates an organizing and bargaining model that poses severe problems for 
the establishment of effective trade unions. In the past, unions were often able to partially 
overcome these barriers in particular sectors of the economy, especially large manufacturing, 
resource extraction, construction and the regulated private sector. Their ability to do so today is 
diminished as jobs in the large manufacturing sector are being lost and fewer sectors of the 
economy are shielded from competition because of free trade and de-regulation. Under these 
conditions, fighting to preserve or strengthen Wagnerism, whether through political action or 
constitutional litigation may bring some amelioration, but it is not the long-term answer labour 
needs to reverse its declining dominion. 
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IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
It is customary in articles announcing the death of Wagnerism to end with a section 
identifying legal reforms that point the way forward, but usually these efforts suffer from forced 
optimism. Here I come back to David Harvey’s earlier observation that the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism is a class project not a natural process of adjustment (Harvey 2005). This is an 
important insight because if it is true then appeals for more labour-management cooperation or 
normative arguments that collective labour rights are a good thing are unlikely to have much 
traction. New governance theories call for big sticks to step in where self-regulation fails, but 
there is no prospect for big stick legislation (Estlund 2010); employer neutrality agreements are 
legal in Canada but are little used and the most recent experiment with them, the Framework of 
Fairness agreement between the CAW and Magna, yielded nothing (Doorey 2013; Van Alphen 
2011). Employee participation plans are also legal in Canada and some employers have made 
use of them (e.g., Magna, WestJet) but in general these arrangements have not spread much 
beyond joint health and safety committees that are legally required (Lewchuk & Wells 2007; 
Stephenson 2013); minority unions in Canada have no right to bargain for their members only 
(although they are free to try), but even if they gained such a right,41 is there any prospect, 
outside perhaps of some small niches, that minority unions could bargain effectively in a 
decentralized bargaining regime and establish a beachhead from which strong unions could 
grow?42 
I think a frank assessment must start from the premise that at present there is no legal 
solution to labour’s difficulties that is within reach, politically or through constitutional 
litigation. We are more likely to witness legislative degradation of Wagnerism than to it being 
strengthened or replaced with laws that will better promote collective labour rights and 
constitutional litigation will likely, at best, protect thin labour rights, primarily in the public 
sector. This is not to say that efforts to protect existing labour rights against further degradation 
should be abandoned, but rather to recognize that holding on to what we’ve got will not 
fundamentally alter the trajectory of organized labour’s decline.  
More promising then are accounts of workers and unions trying to break out of the mould in 
which they have been shaped (or shaped themselves) under Wagnerism and experimenting with 
new ways of organizing and representing workers. In a recent article addressing the situation in 
the United States, Ruth Milkman has pointed growing experimentation with a diversity of 
organization forms and strategies that in some ways resemble the way the labour movement 
operated prior to the Wagner Act. Broadly defined as “alt-labour”, these include worker centers, 
organizations of fast-food and retail workers like “Our Walmart”, associations of independent 
contractors, etc. Notably, the immediate goal of these organizations is not to become certified 
bargaining agents, but rather to improve working conditions through media campaigns, 
boycotts and brief demonstration strikes to shame and pressure employers, and political 
campaigns undertaken in alliance with other community-based organizations and progressive 
activists to raise minimum wages to living wages or better enforce existing labour laws 
(Milkman 2013; Early 2013).  
So it is not the case that alt-labour is abandoning legal and legislative change as a strategic 
objective. Rather, it is that the immediate goal is not the preservation of Wagnerism but the 
building of new organizational forms and strategic capacities through which workers’ collective 
class interests can be represented and advanced outside of traditional collective bargaining. 
Traditional collective bargaining, of course, will continue in those sectors where it is viable, as 
will struggles to protect it, but a single-minded focus on expanding union density through the 
Wagner Act model is no longer a viable strategy. 
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NOTES 
                                                   
 
1  With apologies to Dylan Thomas, “And Death Shall Have No Dominion,” in The Collected Poems of 
Dylan Thomas (1957). 
2  Majoritarian exclusivity is the requirement that unions establish majority support of a bargaining unit 
to obtain bargaining rights and that once they do so they represent all members of the bargaining 
unit.  
3  On the importance of Wagnerism’s limiting features, see Fudge and Glasbeek (1994-1995) and Adams 
(1994-1995).  . 
4  R v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43, paras. 61-65. 
5  Other recent expressions of concern over the future of WAM include, Lynk (2014); Slinn (2014); 
Burkett (2013)(focusing on the expanded role of courts and government at the expense of labour 
boards); and Goddard (2013) (focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of Wagnerism that 
simultaneously undermine its effectiveness and the motivation of unions to seek fundamental 
reforms).   
6  Calculated from Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Survey, June 2013.  These data do not allow for a 
precise calculation because the percentage of the workforce in each province covered by federal law is 
not provided.  The five provinces contain about 30% of the labour force, but this does not include the 
percentage of the labour force in the other provinces and territories that come under federal law.  
Overall, the federal jurisdiction is estimated to cover less than ten percent of the labour force. 
7  For discussion of these changes and the current state of Ontario labour law as it affects organizing, see 
Bartkiw (2008).  There is a further point that I will address in part 3.  Banks’ is largely concerned with 
measuring the economic impact of free trade on labour rights, and argues that politics may be more 
important than economics in this regard.  Leaving aside the question of the linkages between 
economics and politics, Banks’ discussion of economic influence fails to take into account the impact 
of the changing economic environment on the effectiveness of labour law.  There has been a 
significant decline in trade union density, particularly in the private sector, during the free trade era, 
driven in part by changes in industry structure, employment practices and an increase in employer 
opposition to collective bargaining, all of which are arguably exacerbated by free trade.  The fact that 
private sector trade union density and bargaining power is occurring without a legislative assault on 
trade union rights arguably reduces the demand for such action.      
8  The current version of Bill 5 is Public Service Essential Services Act, SS 2008, c P-42.2 and Bill 6 was 
an amendment to The Trade Union Act, RSS 1978, c T-17.  
9  To see Bill 85 as introduced, visit: 
http://docs.legassembly.sk.ca/legdocs/Bills/27L2S/Bill27-85.pdf 
10  Saskatchewan Employment Act, S.S. 2013, S-15.1. 
11  Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act, S.C. 2011, c. 17. 
12  Ibid., s. 11(2). 
13  Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2. 
14  Protecting Air Service Act, S.C. 2012, c. 2. 
15  Ibid., ss. 14(4) and 29(2).  
16  Restoring Rail Service Act, S.C. 2012, c. 8. 
17  Economic Action Plan 2013Act, No. 1, S.C. 2013, c. 33, s. 229. 
18  Economic Action Plan 2013Act, No. 2, S.C. 2013, c. 40, Div. 17. 
19  There are other changes not discussed here.  For a more detailed survey, see Rootham (n.d). 
20  See Benzie (2012); Brennan (2014); An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code, the Parliamentary 
Employment and Staff Relations Act and the Public Service Labour Relations Act (certification and 
revocation — bargaining agent), Bill C-525.  On 29 January 2014 the Bill received second reading 
and was referred to committee.  
21  The Toronto Electric Commissioners v Colin G. Snider and others [1925] UKPC 2, [1925] AC 396 (20 
January 1925), P.C. (on appeal from Ontario). 
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22  Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 313; 
PSAC v. Canada, 1987 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 424; and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, 1987 
CanLII 90 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 460  
23  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94 (CanLII), [2001] 3 SCR 1016. 
24  Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 16. 
25  Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 
(CanLII), [2007] 2 SCR 391. 
26  Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 760 (CanLII) and Ontario (Attorney General) v. 
Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 
27  See Tucker (2012).   For the view that the OCA did not have empirical evidence of the need for 
majoritarian exclusivity, see Bartkiw (2009). 
28  Robert Meredith, et al v. Attorney General of Canada, 2013 FCA 112, para. 90.  The impossibility 
standard was also applied in Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 
2102 ONCA 363.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been granted in both cases. 
29  Ibid. 
30  The duty to bargain in good faith itself is notoriously difficult to enforce given the problematic 
distinction between hard bargaining, which is permitted, and bad faith bargaining, which is not 
(Langille and Macklem 1988).  The meaning of a duty to consult in good faith is uncertain.  For a 
recent judgment that gives that duty some teeth, see British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British 
Columbia, 2014 BCSC 121 (CanLII).  However, the case is under appeal and the lower court’s 
declaration of unconstitutionality has been stayed.  See British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. 
British Columbia, 2014 BCCA 75 (CanLII). 
31  A compromise between the duty to bargain in good faith and simply a duty to listen might be that 
whatever process is provided it must not make it impossible for workers acting collectively to 
meaningfully influence workplace conditions.  So, provided government action does not render a 
process of consultation “pointless” then it will pass constitutional muster.  See Meredith, supra., para. 
92. 
32  See Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2012 SKQB 62 (CanLII) and R v 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43 (CanLII), 
33  See R v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43 (CanLII) at paras. 58-59. 
34  See Alberta LRB decision, Old Dutch Foods, 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/ablrb/doc/2009/2009canlii61316/2009canlii61316.html required 
Rand as a constitutional guarantee.  It was reversed on other grounds and the Alberta Court of Appeal 
declined to hear the constitutional argument since the case was moot.  See Alberta (Attorney General) 
v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 401, 2010 ABQB 777 (CanLII), and 2011 
ABCA 93 (CanLII) viewed on 2013-09-04  
35  Calculated from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 282-0078. 
36  Calculated from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 282-0073.   
37  Calculated from CANSIM Table 281-0042. 
38  Self-employment has grown from 14% in 1990 to 15.2% in 2012 (calculated from Statistics Canada, 
CANSIM Table 282-0012); part-time employment has grown from 17% to 18.8 percent over the same 
period (calculated from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 282-0002); and temporary employment 
increased from 11.3% in 1997 to 13.6% in 2012 (calculated from CANSIM Table 282-0080). 
39  From Tucker (forthcoming).  
40  Calculated from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 282-0078. 
41  Does anyone really expect that a Canadian legislature will enact a law compelling employers to 
bargain with minority unions, or believe that the courts will hold freedom of association requires 
private sector employers to negotiate with or consider representations from minority unions or 
requires government to enact legislation imposing such a duty? 
42  For a positive assessment in the US context that also acknowledges the risks, see Fisk and Tashlitsky 
(2011). 
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